We generalize Merton's framework by incorporating an insurable loss. Motivated by new insurance products, we allow not only the financial market but also the insurable loss to depend on the regime of the economy. An investor wants to select an optimal consumption, investment, and insurance policy that maximizes his expected total discounted utility of consumption over an infinite time horizon. For the case of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions, we obtain the first explicit solutions for optimal consumption, investment, and insurance problem when there is regime switching. We determine that the optimal insurance contract is either noinsurance or deductible insurance, and calculate when it is optimal to buy insurance. The optimal policy depends strongly on the regime of the economy. Through an economic analysis, we calculate the advantage of buying insurance. We also observe that as long as optimal insurance is nonzero in one regime, investors gain benefits in all regimes from insurance.
Introduction
The classical consumption and investment problem seeks optimal strategies of consumption and investment for a risk-averse investor who wants to maximize the expected utility of consumption. Merton (1969) was the first to find explicit solutions to this problem in continuous time by applying stochastic control theory. Karatzas et al. (1991) extended Merton's results in an incomplete market and applied martingale approach to obtain explicit solutions. Many early generalizations and improvements to Merton's work can be found in the monograph Sethi (1997) . In the classical consumption and investment problem, there is only one source of risk which comes from the uncertainty of the stocks prices. But in real life, apart from the risk exposure in the financial market, investors often face other random insurable risks, such as mortality risk, automobile collision risk and credit default risk. So it will be more realistic and practical to extend the classical consumption and investment model by incorporating an insurable risk. When an additional insurable risk is present to an investor, buying insurance is a trade-off decision. On the one hand, insurance can provide the investor with compensation and then offset capital losses if the specified risk events happen. But on the other hand, the cost of insurance policy diminishes the investor's ability to consume and therefore reduces the investor's expected utility.
The original optimal insurance problem studies an individual who is exposed to an insurable risk and attempts to find the optimal amount of capital on insurance under utility maximization criterion. Using the expected value principle for premium, Arrow (1963) found the optimal insurance is deductible insurance in discrete time. Promislov and Young (2005) reviewed optimal insurance problem (without investment and consumption). They also proposed a general market model and obtained explicit solutions to optimal insurance problem using different premium principles, such as variance principle, equivalent utility principle, Wang's principle, et cétera. Moore and Young (2006) was the first to study optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem in continuous time. They found explicit or numerical solutions for different utility functions (without verification proof). Perera (2010) extended Moore and Young's work by considering the same problem in a more general Levy market and applied martingale approach to solve the problem for exponential utility function. Pirvu and Zhang (2012) added mortality risk into Merton's original model and studied optimal investment, consumption and life insurance problem in a financial market which presents mean-reverting feature.
In traditional models, the market parameters like the risk-free interest rate, stock returns and volatility are assumed to be independent of general macroeconomic conditions. However, historical data and empirical research both suggest that the market behavior is affected by long-term economic conditions, which may change dramatically as time evolves. For instance, the risk-free interest rate (overnight money market financing rate) in Canada reached as high as 4.5521% on August 9, 2007, but went down to 0.2281% on July 30, 2009 during the financial crisis. However it stayed relatively stable in each time period, which can be seen from Table 1 we introduce market regimes in the economy and assign regimes for different economic conditions (time periods), we can model the risk-free interest rate more appropriately. Hamilton (1989) introduced a regime switching model for the first time to capture the movements of the stock prices and showed that the model with regime switching represents the stock returns better than the model with deterministic coefficients. Thereafter, regime switching has been applied to model many financial and economic problems. In regard to optimal portfolio selection problem, Zhou and Yin (2004) considered a financial market with regime switching and studied the problem under the Markowitz's mean-variance criterion. Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) considered the problem under the utility maximization criterion, and found explicit solutions for HARA utility functions. In the insurance market, the underwriting cycle has been well documented in the literature. Empirical research also provides evidence between the external economy and the underwriting performance of insurance policies. Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) found that there is a long-run cointegration relation between the combined ratio (which is defined as the ratio of the sum of incurred losses and expenses over earned premium) and the general economic factors, including gross domestic product (GDP), short-term interest rate and consumer price index (CPI). By investigating the comovements of credit default swap (CDS) and the markets of bond and stocks, Norden and Weber (2007) found that CDS spreads are negatively correlated with the price movements of the corresponding stocks and such cointegration is affected by the bond volume. We have seen increasing number of research in insurance using regime switching models recently. For instance, Siu (2005) priced a life insurance policy in a regime switching market.
In this paper, we use an observable continuous-time Markov chain to model the regime of the economy and allow both the financial market and the insurance market to depend on the regime of the economy. Our objective is to find optimal consumption, investment and insurance strategies for a riskaverse investor who seeks to maximize his expected total discounted utility of consumption over an infinite time horizon. As far as we know, this is the first paper in the literature that provides rigorous verification theorems associated with optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem where there is regime switching. We extend Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) by including a random loss in the model and an insurance policy in the control. We also generalize Moore and Young (2006) by allowing regime switching in the markets. Another mathematical contribution of this paper is to formally verify the candidate strategies are indeed optimal strategies. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our model and formulate the problem. The verification theorems are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we obtain explicit solutions for four HARA utility functions. In Section 5, we conduct an economic analysis to investigate the impact of various factors on optimal policy and the expected utility. Section 6 concludes our study.
The Model
Consider a complete probability space (Ω, F, P) in which a standard Brownian motion W and an observable continuous-time Markov chain with finite state space S are defined. Denote S = {1, 2, · · · , S}, where S is the number of regimes in the economy. The matrix Q = (q ij ) S×S denotes the strongly irreducible generator of , where j∈S q ij = 0, ∀ i ∈ S.
In our model, the financial market consists of two assets, a bond P 0 (riskless asset) and a stock P 1 (risky asset), respectively. Their prices processes are driven by the following dynamics:
with initial conditions P 0 (0) = 1 and P 1 (0) > 0. The coefficients r i , µ i and σ i , i ∈ S, are all positive constants.
An investor chooses π = {π(t), t ≥ 0}, the proportion of wealth invested in the stock P 1 , and a consumption rate process c = {c(t), t ≥ 0}. We assume the investor is exposed to an insurable loss L(t, (t), X(t)), 1 where X(t) denotes the investor's wealth at time t. We use a Poisson process N with intensity λ (t) , where λ i > 0 for every i ∈ S, to model the occurrence of the insurable loss. In the insurance market, there are insurance policies available to insure against the loss L t and the investor can control the payout amount I(t), where I(t) : [0, ∞) × Ω → [0, ∞) and I(t, ω) := I t (L(t, (t, ω), X(t, ω))), or in short, I(t) = I t (L t ). For example, if ∆N (t 0 ) = 1, then at time t 0 the investor suffers a loss of amount L t 0 but receives a compensation of amount I t 0 (L t 0 ) from the insurance policy, so the investor's net loss is
We assume the investor pays premium at rate P continuously and follow the premium setting used in Moore and Young (2006) 
where the positive constant θ i , i ∈ S, is known as the loading factor in the insurance industry. Such extra positive loading comes from insurance companies' administrative cost, tax, profit, et cétera.
Following Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) , we assume the Brownian motion W , the Poisson process N and the Markov chain are mutually independent. We also assume the loss process L is independent of N . We take the P−augmented filtration generated by W , N , L and as our filtration {F t } t≥0 and define F := σ(∪ t≥0 F t ).
Our motivation for incorporating an insurable risk into the consumption and investment framework comes from the bailout case of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), in which credit default risk played a critical role (Please see Sjostrom (2009) for more details on AIG bailout case.). From 2004 to 2007, the issuance volume of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1 2007 and many investment banks and financial institutions were actively engaged in the trading of CDOs (The statistical data is cited from http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation.). In order to protect themselves against the default of CDOs payments and in accord with the international regulations known as the Basel Accords, those investment banks and financial institutions brought a proposal to AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), known as credit default swap (CDS), which requires the insured to pay AIGFP a certain amount of premium in return for compensation if a default event and/or other specified credit events happen during the lifetime of a CDS contract. Since the underlying debt securities carried blue-chip ratings and AIGFP was mostly interested in writing CDS for the CDOs with AAA rating, so AIGFP thought such proposal was almost certain to make profits and was happy to accept the proposal and sell CDS to those investment banks and financial institutions.
For example, a bank holding CDOs backed by a corporate bond can enter a CDS contract with AIGFP to insure against the default risk and other credit events, such as the downgrading of the corporate bond and the falling of the corporate stock price below certain level. Such CDS has a strong correlation with the financial market for several reasons (see Norden and Weber (2007) for empirical evidence.). First, the default risk of a corporate bond is highly correlated with the corporate's stock performance. Second, many credit events specified by CDS contracts take the LIBOR quota or market index as references. Besides, the default risk of a bond is much higher in a bear market than that in a bull market. Furthermore, interest rate is a crucial factor for calculating the bond price and the settlement compensation of a CDS contract. Of course, a CDS contract is not exactly the same as a traditional insurance policy and is usually traded over-the-counter with private counterparties. However they act in a similar way: the buyer pays premium to obtain protection against specified losses in the contract. Thus we can treat CDS as a generalized insurance contract.
For an investor with a control of triplet strategies u(t) := (π(t), c(t), I(t)), the stochastic differential equation for the wealth process X is
with initial conditions X(0) = x and (0) = i ∈ S.
We define the criterion function J as
where δ > 0 is the discount rate and E x,i means conditional expectation under X(0) = x and (0) = i. We assume that for every i ∈ S, the utility function U (·, i) is C 2 (0, +∞), strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies the linear growth condition
Besides, we use the notation U (0, i) := lim
We define the bankruptcy time as
Since an investor can consume only when her/his wealth is strictly positive, we have
A control u := (π, c, I) is called admissible if {u t } t≥0 is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration {F t } t≥0 and satisfies, ∀ t ≥ 0
and
We use A x,i to denote the set of all admissible controls with initial conditions X(0) = x and (0) = i. Then we can formulate our optimization problem as follows.
Problem 2.1 Select an admissible control u * = (π * , c * , I * ) ∈ A x,i that maximizes the criterion function J and find the value function
The control u * is called an optimal control or an optimal policy.
Verification Theorems
Let ψ : (0, ∞) × S → R be a function with ψ(·, i) ∈ C 2 (0, ∞), ∀ i ∈ S. We define the operator L u i for i ∈ S, u ∈ A := {(π, c, I) : u ∈ R, c ∈ R
where ψ = ∂ψ ∂x
for every x > 0, i ∈ S, and the control u * = (π * , c * , I * ) defined by
is admissible, then u * is an optimal control to Problem 2.1. In addition, the value function is given by
Furthermore, if the utility function does not depend on the regime, namely U (y, i) = U (y), for every i ∈ S, then the value function V (x, i) = v(x, i).
Proof. Given any admissible control u, consider the function f (t, X t , t ) :
). By applying Ito's formula for Markov-modulated processes (see, for instance, Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009)), we get
where {m f t } t≥0 is a martingale with m f 0 = 0. Let 0 < a < X 0 = x < b < ∞ and define a stopping time τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≤ a or X t ≥ b}. Then by replacing t by t ∧ τ in (3), taking conditional expectation and applying HJB equation (2), we obtain
Let a ↓ 0, b ↑ +∞ and t → ∞, then t ∧ τ → Θ. Since f is continuous, we obtain
and hence,
Define g(t, t ) :
. Applying Ito formula to g(t, t ) yields
where {m g t } t≥0 is a square-integrable martingale with m g 0 = 0. Taking conditional expectation and applying the monotone convergence theorem to the above equality, we get
Since the utility function U satisfies the linear growth condition, we have
Then inequality (4) can be rearranged as
and the equality will be achieved when u = u * . If the utility function does not depend on the regime, then
The following theorem deals with the case when
2 (0, ∞) be an increasing and concave function such that v(0, i) = −∞ for every i ∈ S. If v(·, i) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
for ∀ x > 0, i ∈ S, and the control u * = (π * , c * , I * )
is admissible, then u * is an optimal control to Problem 2.1 and the value function is V (x, i) = v(x, i).
Proof. Define h(t, X t , t ) := e −δt v(X t , t ). For any admissible control u, by following a similar argument as in Theorem 3.1, we get
Since u is admissible and U satisfies the linear growth condition,
Then the above inequality becomes
By letting a ↓ 0, b ↑ +∞ and t → ∞, and applying the monotone convergence theorem, we obtain
and the equality holds when u = u * .
Explicit Solutions of Value Function and Optimal Strategies
In this section, we obtain explicit solutions to optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem when there is regime switching in the economy. We assume the utility function is of HARA type and the insurable loss L is proportional to the investor's wealth, L(t, (t), X(t)) = η (t) l t X t . Here for every i ∈ S, η i > 0 measures the intensity of the insurable loss in regime i, and for every t ≥ 0, l t denotes the loss proportion at time t. We assume l t ∈ F t and l t ∈ (0, 1) for all t ≥ 0.
To construct candidate for optimal policy, we fix time t, and suppress the time variable t from all processes by letting X t = x, t = i, l t = l. So the candidate policy is a function of (x, i, l), namely, π
we find π * and c * are independent of l.). Once we have verified the candidate policy is indeed optimal, we reverse the above step and write optimal policy in continuous time.
We rewrite HJB equation (2) as
and HJB equation (5) as
We conjecture that v(·, i) is strictly increasing and concave for every i ∈ S. Then a candidate for π * is given by
Since U is strictly decreasing, the inverse of U exists. Then a candidate for c * is given by
For optimal insurance, we have the following lemma and theorem.
Lemma 4.1 ∀ x > 0 and i ∈ S, denote z 0 := η i l 0 x, where constant l 0 ∈ (0, 1). We denote the optimal insurance policy by I * . Then we have (a) I * (x, i, l 0 ) = 0 if and only if
Proof. ∀ i ∈ S, we use the notation z := η i lx. We then break the proof into four steps.
Step 1:
, where ζ > 0 and G(l) = 1 when l 0 − ρ < l ≤ l 0 + ρ and 0 otherwise, ρ > 0. Here we choose small ζ and ρ to ensure that 0 ≤Ī(z) ≤ z. Let
Since I * is the maximizer of f I (x, i, l; I), we have
Using Taylor expansion and letting ζ → 0 + , we get
Letting ρ → 0 + and applying the mean value theorem of integrals, we obtain
which is a contradiction since v (x, i) > 0 and θ i > 0, ∀i ∈ S.
Step 2:
For small enough ζ and ρ, we have 0 ≤Ī (z) ≤ z. Then a similar argument as above gives the desired result
Step 3:
In this step, we considerĪ(x, i, l) andĪ (x, i, l). From the results in Step 1 and Step 2, we obtain (1
at the same time, and thus the equality is achieved.
Step 4:
, which is a contradiction to the given condition. Similar method also applies to the proof of (1
Theorem 4.1 The optimal insurance is either no insurance or deductible insurance (almost surely).
(a) The optimal insurance is no insurance I * (x, i, l) = 0, ∀i ∈ S when
(b) The optimal insurance is deductible insurance
Proof. We complete the proof in three steps.
Step 1: Prove Case (a). Assume there exists l 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that 0 < I
, which is a contradiction to the given condition. Therefore I * (x, i, l) = 0 on the set N c l . Besides, if two policies I 1 and I 2 only differ on a negligible set, we have f I (i, l; I 1 ) = f I (i, l; I 2 ), which is due to the fact that the integration of a bounded function on a negligible set is zero.
So we have proved that I * (x, i, l) = 0 almost surely when (
Step 2: Prove Case (b). We notice that v (·, i) is a strictly decreasing function, so if such d i exists, it must be unique. We then break our discussion into two disjoint scenarios.
Then by part (a) of Lemma 4.1, we obtain
In this scenario, we have 0
Due to the monotonicity of v (·, i), we must have
Step 3: Show that either (10) or (11) holds. If condition (10) fails, then
If (11) has no solution in (0, x), then
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal insurance is either no insurance or deductible insurance.
To find explicit solutions to optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem, we consider four utility functions of HARA class. The first three utility functions do not depend on the market regimes:
The fourth utility function depends on the regime of the economy and we assume there are two regimes in the economy (S = 2).
All those four utility functions are C 2 (0, ∞), strictly increasing and concave, and satisfy the linear growth condition. To be specific, we can take K = 1 for the first three utility functions and K = max{β 1 , β 2 } for the last one.
In this case, a solution to HJB equation (7) is given bŷ
where the constantsÂ i , i ∈ S, will be determined below.
, we obtain from (8) and (9) that
and c * (x, i) = δx.
Therefore, HJB equation (7) reads as
where
and I be the S × S identity matrix. Then the constant vector A satisfies the linear system
Proposition 4.1 The functionv(·, i), i ∈ S, given bŷ
where Â = (Â 1 ,Â 2 , · · · ,Â S ) solves the linear system (13), is the value function of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
is an optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Proof. The functionv(·, i) defined above is a smooth function with strictly increasing and concave property such thatv(0, i) = −∞. By the construction of vector Â ,v(·, i) satisfies HJB equation (7). Since we cannot solve SDE (1) explicitly, to show candidate policy is admissible, we consider an upper bound process Z of X *
with initial value Z(0) = x. Solving the above SDE gives
By the definition of Z, we have X * t ≤ Z t , ∀t ≥ 0. Notice that if (t) = i for t ∈ (t 1 , t 2 ], then
dW (s) is a linear combination of independent Brownian motions. By the exponential martingale property of Brownian motion, we have
For the candidate of optimal investment proportion π * ,
For the candidate of optimal consumption c * ,
For the candidate of optimal insurance
Therefore, u * = (π * , c * , I * ) is optimal policy of Problem 2.1, and by Theorem 3.2,v(·, i) is the corresponding value function.
Remark 4.1 The optimal insurance I * also satisfies the usual properties I * t (0) = 0 and I * t (·) is an increasing function (Such result holds for all the utility functions we discuss in this paper).
Example 4.1 S = 2 In this example, we assume there are two regimes in the economy, where regime 1 represents a bull market while regime 2 represents a bear market. When the market is in bull regime, the stocks prices are rising or expected to rise, and the interest rate is relatively high due to the good performance of the market and high demand for borrowing. Investors are more likely to invest in risky assets and have less desire to seek protection against default risks. Besides, the probability of having default events is smaller when the economy is booming. Therefore, insurance companies will charge less premium in a bull market because of low demand and high competition. When the market crashes down and turns into bear regime, the stocks prices are falling and the economic recession will cause the high volatility of stock prices. So more investors would prefer riskless asset rather than risky assets in a bear market and have more concerns about the possibility of defaults, which leads to a high demand for insurance policies. In the mean time, the possibility of suffering from default losses becomes much higher in a bear market. Both changes contribute to the rise of premium requested from insurance companies. Our analysis is supported by empirical research, for instance, French et al. (1987) concluded that stock returns are higher in a bull market, Hamilton and Lin (1996) found stock volatility is higher in a bear market, Haley (1993) found the underwriting margin (profit) is negatively correlated with the interest rate.
Based on the above analysis, we set r 1 > r 2 , µ 1 > µ 2 , σ 1 < σ 2 , θ 1 < θ 2 and η 1 < η 2 .
The generator matrix entries will be q 11 = −Π 1 , q 12 = Π 1 , q 21 = Π 2 , q 22 = −Π 2 with Π 1 , Π 2 > 0, so the linear system (13) becomes
which gives the unique solution
where i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. From the above expression ofÂ i , we notice that onlyΛ i is not directly given by the market. To calculateΛ i , we assume loss proportion l t does not depend on time t and we discuss the cases when l is constant or uniformly distributed on (0, 1). We further assume
. If the opposite is true, then we switch the expressions when calculatingΛ 1 andΛ 2 .
1. l is constant.
, 1)
2. l is uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
,
Therefore,
In this scenario, a solution to HJB equation (7) is given bỹ
where the constantsÃ i > 0, i ∈ S, will be determined below.
By plugging the candidate policy into HJB equation (7), we find the constantsÃ i should satisfy the following non-linear system
In order to guarantee the above non-linear system has a unique positive solution, we need the following technical condition
Lemma 4.2 The non-linear system (15) has a unique positive solutionÃ i if condition (16) holds.
Proof. See Lemma 4.1 in Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009).

Proposition 4.2 The function v(·, i), i ∈ S, given bỹ
whereÃ i is the unique solution to the non-linear system (15), is the value function of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
Proof. Under the candidate policy u * , we cannot obtain the explicit solution X * from SDE (1). Therefore, to verify the candidate policy is admissible, we consider an upper bound processZ of X * with the dynamics
GivenZ 0 = X * 0 = x, we can solve the above SDE to obtaiñ
We use this upper bound processZ to verify that the conditions for an admissible control are satisfied. ∀ t ≥ 0, we have
Besides, we can verify that I * t ∈ I t since 0 ≤ I *
Therefore, u * t defined above is admissible and then is optimal policy of Problem 2.1. By definition, smooth functionṽ(·, i) is strictly increasing and concave, and satisfiesṽ(0, i) = −∞, ∀i ∈ S. From the construction ofÃ i , HJB equation (7) holds for all i ∈ S. Therefore, according to Theorem 3.2, v(x, i) is the value function of Problem 2.1.
Example 4.2 S = 2
To solve the non-linear system (15), we need to findΛ i first. In this example, we show how to findΛ i when l is constant or follows a uniform distribution on (0, 1). Without loss of generality, we assume
. If the opposite holds, switch the formulas forΛ 1 andΛ 2 . The results will be used for economic analysis in the next section.
1.3
Since (η i l − ν i ) + = 0, we have for i = 1, 2
and we get for i = 1, 2
If α = −1, theñ
If α = −1
In this case, a solution to HJB equation (6) has the form
where the constantsĀ i > 0, i ∈ S will be determined below. Then we can find the candidate for π * and c * as 
Plugging the candidate policy into HJB equation (6) yields
We need to impose an extra requirement for δ δ > max
Lemma 4.3 The non-linear system (18) has a unique positive solutionĀ i , i ∈ S if condition (19) is satisfied.
Proof. See Lemma 4.2 in Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009).
Proposition 4.3 The functionv(x, i) =Ā
1−α i x α , x ≥ 0, whereĀ i is the unique solution to the non-linear system (18), is the value function of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
Proof. We use the same upper bound processZ t defined in Section 4.2. By following a similar argument as in the previous proposition, we can easily verify E x,i t 0
c * s ds < ∞ and I * t ∈ I t , ∀t ≥ 0. Besides, we have
is strictly increasing and concave, and satisfiesv(0, i) = U (0,i) δ = 0 for all i ∈ S. By the construction of constants A i , HJB equation (7) holds for all i ∈ S.
Therefore, u * is admissible and then is optimal policy of Problem 2.1, and by Theorem 3.1,v(x, i), i ∈ S defined above is the value function of Problem 2.1.
In this case, a solution to HJB equation (6) is given by
where the constantsǍ i > 0, i = 1, 2 will be determined below.
) 2 , we obtain the candidate for π * and c * π
and c
So a candidate for optimal insurance is
From HJB equation (6), we obtain the following nonlinear system
. Since S = 2, so we have q 11 = −Π 1 , q 12 = Π 1 , q 21 = Π 2 , q 22 = −Π 2 with Π 1 , Π 2 > 0. Thus we can rewrite the above system aš
Lemma 4.4 The non-linear system (21) has a real solutionǍ i ≥
Proof. The non-linear system (21) is equivalent tǒ
Solving this system forǍ 1 gives
The discriminant of the above quadratic equation is
, we haveξ i > 1, i = 1, 2 and then ∆ > 0, which impliesǍ 1 has a real solution. Besides, Ǎ 1Ǎ2 ≥ 0, sǒ
2Π 1ξ1 > 0. Similar analysis also applies toǍ 2 .
Proposition 4.4 The functionv(x, i) = (Ǎ i x) 1/2 , x ≥ 0, whereǍ i is the positive solution to the non-linear system (21), is the value function of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
Proof. We consider an upper bound processŽ of X * to verify that the candidate policy is admissible. The dynamics ofŽ is given by
with initial conditionŽ 0 = X * 0 = x. The solution to the above SDE iš
{r i + 4γ i }, and
We have proved u * is admissible and thus u * is optimal policy of Problem 2.1. By definition,v(·, i) ∈ C 2 (0, ∞) is strictly increasing and concave, and
, i = 1, 2. By the construction ofǍ i , HJB equation (6) is satisfied for i = 1, 2. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, the value function to Problem 2.1 isv(x, i) +
Economic Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of market parameters and the investor's risk aversion attitude on optimal policy and how insurance affects expected utility of consumption (the value function). To conduct the economic analysis, we assume there are two regimes in the economy, like in Example 4.1 and 4.2: regime 1 represents a bull market while regime 2 represents a bear market. We only consider the first three utility functions in the economic analysis.
Impact of market parameters and risk aversion on optimal policy
According to the results in Section 4, we obtain the uniform expression of optimal proportion invested in the stock as
where α = 0 when U (y, i) = ln(y). During any given regime, the optimal investment proportion in the stock π * is constant, and only depends on market parameters (expected excess return over variance) and the investor's risk aversion attitude.
The dependency of π * on market parameters is evident. Through empirical research, French et al. (1987) find that the expected excess return over variance is higher in good economy. Therefore investors should spend a greater proportion of their wealth on the stock during a bull market.
Expression (22) shows that π * is inversely proportional to the relative risk aversion 1 − α, so low risk-averse investors (with greater α) will spend more fraction of their wealth on the stock.
For all three cases, the optimal consumption rate process is proportional to the wealth process and such ratio κ(t) :=
is given by
, for U (y, i) = −y α , α < 0;
Since κ(t) is positive in all three cases, investors will consume proportionally more when they become richer. To examine the dependency of the optimal consumption to wealth ratio κ(t) on α, we separate our discussion into the following three cases. For moderate risk-averse investors (α = 0), κ(t) is constant regardless of the market regimes, so moderate risk-averse investors consume the same proportion of their wealth in both bull and bear markets.
For high risk-averse investors (α < 0), their optimal consumption to wealth ratio is given by 1/Ã i , i = 1, 2, whereÃ can be obtained from the system (15). To find a numerical solution to the system (15), we set market parameters as µ 1 = 0.2, µ 2 = 0.15, r 1 = 0.08, r 2 = 0.03, σ 1 = 0.25, σ 2 = 0.6, θ 1 = 0.15, θ 2 = 0.25, η 1 = 0.8, η 2 = 1, λ 1 = 0.1, λ 2 = 0.2, Π 1 = 6.04, Π 2 = 6.4 (For the convenience of citation thereafter, we denote the choice for market parameters here as Parameter Set I). To guarantee condition (16) is satisfied, we choose δ = 0.15. We draw graphs for optimal consumption to wealth ratio when −1 < α < 0 and l = 0.3, l = 0.5, and l = 0.7. Apparently, optimal consumption to wealth ratio is an increasing function of α, so investors will consume proportionally more when they become more risk tolerant. For the above parameter values, we find 1/Ã 1 > 1/Ã 2 , which can be seen from Figure 1 . Hence investors should allocate more proportion of their wealth to consumption in a bull market. For any chosen investor (fixed α), he/she will behave more conservatively by reducing the proportion spent in consumption when facing larger losses (greater l). This behavior was not noticed in Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) , because they did not incorporate an insurable loss in their model. Besides, from a mathematical point of view, the ratios all converge to 0.15 when α approaches 0, which is exactly the same optimal consumption to wealth ratio when α = 0 (δ = 0.15).
For low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1), the optimal consumption to wealth ratio is given by 1/Ā i , i = 1, 2, where 1/Ā i can be calculated from the system (18). Notice that the systems (15) and (18) are the same except optimal consumption to wealth ratio when l = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. Similar to the previous case, we also observe that optimal consumption to wealth ratio will increase when investors become more risk tolerant (α becomes larger). But contrary to the previous case, we have 1/Ā 1 < 1/Ā 2 when 0 < α < 1. This means low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1) spend a lower proportion of their wealth on consumption in a bull market. Unlike the former numerical example, in which the difference of κ in bull and bear markets is small and stable, here we find the difference of κ in two markets grows significantly when α increases to 1, so the optimal consumption to wealth ratio is highly sensitive when α is close to 1. We also notice that for very low risk-averse investors (α close to 1), the optimal consumption to wealth ratio is even greater than 1, meaning they finance consumption by borrowing.
By comparing all three cases, we conclude that all investors increase the proportion of consumption in every market regime when their risk tolerance increases (α increases). However, investors' consumption decision depends on the market regimes and investors with different risk aversion attitudes behave differently in bull and bear markets.
The optimal insurance for all three utility functions is deductible insurance, and is given by
We observe that, for each fixed regime, the optimal insurance is proportional to the investor's wealth X * . We note that it is optimal to buy insurance if and only if η (t) l − 1 + (1 + θ (t) ) − 1 1−α > 0, or equivalently if and only if
Thus, it is optimal to buy insurance if and only if, relative to the other variables, η (t) is large, l is large, θ (t) is small, and α is small (we recall that α ∈ (−∞, 1)), or in an economic point of view, the insurable loss is large, the cost of insurance is low and the investor is more risk averse. It is surprising that the variable λ (t) does not appear explicitly in this expression. Our explanation is that λ (t) is implicitly incorporated in X * t , so λ (t) is important as well to determine the optimal insurance.
If it is optimal to buy insurance, then, as expected, optimal insurance is proportional to η (t) and l. Furthermore,
and we assume some investors cannot access to the insurance market. Under the constraint of no insurance, the dynamics of the wealth process is given by
Here the insurable loss L(t) = η (t) l(t)X 1 (t). For any u 1 = (π 1 , c 1 ) ∈ A 1 , π 1 and c 1 need to satisfy all the conditions for π and c from the set A x,i . Since for any u 1 = (π 1 , c 1 ) ∈ A 1 , we have (u 1 , I = 0) ∈ A x,i . Therefore, V (x, i) ≥ V 1 (x, i) for all x > 0 and i ∈ S.
We then provide a verification theorem to Problem 5.1 for the first three utility functions of HARA class considered in Section 4. 
where the operator G is defined as
and the control u *
is admissible, then u * 1 is an optimal control to Problem 5.1.
Remark 5.1 The optimal policy given in Theorem 5.1 shows that insurance does not affect the optimal investment proportion in the stock and the optimal consumption to wealth ratio. But we observe that buying insurance does increase the investor's optimal wealth X * 1 , and then enables investors to consume in a greater amount. 5.2.1. U (y) = ln(y), y > 0 When the utility function is given by U (y) = ln(y), we find the value function to Problem 5.1 is given bŷ
where the constantsâ i satisfy the following linear system
To compare the value functionsv andv 1 , we assume there are two regimes (S = 2) in the economy. Under this assumption, we findâ i given bŷ
where i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. We then calculatê
where i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. To facilitate our scenario analysis, we assume
and l is either constant or uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
• Case 1: l is constant.
In this case,Υ i = ln(1 − η i l), i = 1, 2.
(i) Optimal insurance is no insurance for both regimes.
From Example 4.1, we notice when optimal insurance I * is no insurance (Scenarios 1.1, 1.2.1, 1.3.1 in Example 4.1), we haveΛ i = ln(1 − η i l), i = 1, 2. Therefore, we obtainÂ i −â i = 0 and thenv(x, i) =v 1 (x, i) for all x > 0 and i = 1, 2.
(ii) Optimal insurance is strictly positive in at least one regime.
When optimal insurance I * is strictly positive in at least one regime, then we must have at least oneΛ i in the form ofΛ i = − ln(1 + θ i ) − η i l(1 + θ i ) + θ i . Without loss of generality, we assume I * > 0 in regime 1, or equivalently,
where the second inequality comes from − ln(1 + θ 1 ) + θ 1 > 0. Consider
We have w(0) = 0 and
This implies w(l) > 0 for all l ∈ (0, 1), and thenΛ 1 −Υ 1 > 0. Together with the result above, we can claim thatΛ 2 −Υ 2 ≥ 0. Hence, regardless of the optimal insurance I * in regime 2, we havev(x, i) >v 1 (x, i) for both regimes according to (27) . Even when I * (x, i = 2, l) = 0, buying insurance in regime 1 increases the expected utility of consumption in regime 2. This result is somehow stronger than our expectation, that is,v(x, 2) =v 1 (x, 2) when I * (x, 2, l) = 0.
To further study the advantage of buying insurance, we define the increase ratio of the value function by
where V (x, i) and V 1 (x, i) are the value functions to Problem 2.1 and 5.1, respectively.
We assume x = 1 δ . Under this assumption, we have V (x, i) =v(x, i) = A i and V 1 (x, i) =v 1 (x, i) =â i , i = 1, 2. Then we obtain for i = 1, 2
To analyze the impact of the insurable loss on ratio m, we keep l as a variable and choose Parameter Set I along with δ = 0.2. Notice that for the chosen parameters, our assumption is satisfied Since we assume I * > 0 in regime 1, according to Example 4.1, l must be in the interval of (0.16, 1). We draw the graph of the increase ratio of the value function in Figure 3 . As expected, the advantage of buying insurance increases when the insurable loss becomes larger in both regimes. But surprisingly, we find that buying insurance benefits investors more in a bull market, especially when the insurable loss is large (l is big).
• Case 2. l is uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
In this case,
In this scenario, it is obvious thatΛ i =Υ i and thenv(x, i) =v 1 (x, i), for all x > 0 and i ∈ S.
Again we assume I * > 0 in regime 1. Then we havê
.
HereΛ 1 −Υ 1 depends on the premium loading θ and loss intensity η in regime 1. To investigate such dependency, we conduct a numerical simulation. Notice that η 1 must satisfy the condition η 1 ≥ θ 1 1+θ 1 . We draw the difference ofΛ 1 −Υ 1 when θ 1 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 and two extreme cases 0.01 and 0.99 in Figure 4 . We observe thatΛ 1 −Υ 1 is Figure 4 :Λ i −Υ i strictly positive and thereforev(x, i) >v 1 (x, i) for both regimes, which is consistent with our findings in the previous case. Furthermore, as θ increases (which means the cost of insurance policy increases), the difference ofΛ i −Υ i becomes smaller, so the benefit from purchasing insurance policy will decrease. But investors will have more advantage from insurance when facing larger loss (as loss intensity η increases).
U (y) = −y
α , α < 0 The value function to HJB equation (25) is given bỹ
where positive constantsã i satisfy
Comparing with the value function we found in Section 4.2, we haveṽ(x, i) −ṽ 1 (x, i) = −(Ã We assume there are two regimes in the economy and the loss proportion l is constant. We skip the trivial case of I * ≡ 0, in whichṽ(x, i) =ṽ 1 (x, i) in both regimes. We then carry out a numerical simulation to study the non-trivial case, that is I * (x, i, l) > 0 in at least one regime. To solve the systems (15) and (28) numerically, we choose Parameter Set I and δ = 0.25. For the chosen parameters, it is more reasonable to consider the case when l ∈ ( ν 2 η 2 , 1) (Since
is small.). We calculateṽ(x, i) −ṽ 1 (x, i) for various α in Table 2 (When calculatingṽ(x, i) −ṽ 1 (x, i), we take x = 1.). The result clearly confirms our expectation, that isṽ(x, i) >ṽ 1 (x, i) α lṽ(x, 1) −ṽ 1 (x, 1)ṽ(x, 2) −ṽ 1 (x, 2) l = 0. in both regimes. We also observe that the advantage of buying insurance is greater when investors become more risk averse (α decreases to −∞). The size of the insurable loss affects the advantage of buying insurance as well. When the insurable loss that investors face increases (loss proportion increases), buying insurance will give investors more advantage. We obtaiñ v(1, 1) −ṽ 1 (1, 1) >ṽ(1, 2) −ṽ 1 (1, 2), meaning more advantage from buying insurance in a bull market, in most cases except when α = −5, −10. This conclusion almost coincides with our findings from Figure 3 . We conjecture the small discrepancy in the cases of α = −5, −10 is caused by the choice of tiny loss proportion l (When α is deep in negative, l has to be very small to 5. It is obvious thatv(1, i) −v 1 (1, i) > 0 in both regimes. As have seen in the previous cases, the benefit of buying insurance in a bull market strictly outperforms that in a bear market. We also observe a surprising result that the difference of the value functions (benefit of buying insurance) is not an increasing function of α, which is different from the result in Section 5.2.2. But the difference is a concave function of α.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem in a regime switching model which enables the regime of the economy to affect not only the financial market but also the insurance market. A risk-averse investor who faces an insurable risk wants to find optimal consumption, investment and insurance policy that maximizes his expected total discounted utility of consumption over an infinite time horizon.
We have presented the first version of verification theorems for optimal consumption, investment and insurance problem with regime switching in both the financial market and the insurance market. We have also obtained explicit solutions to the value function and optimal policy when utility function belongs to HARA class.
The optimal proportion of wealth invested in the stock is constant in every regime, and is greater in a bull market regardless of the investor's risk aversion attitude. We observe that the less risk averse an investor is, the greater proportion of capital he allocates to the stock.
The optimal consumption to wealth ratio depends on the investor's risk aversion attitude, except for moderate risk-averse investors (α = 0), who consume at a constant proportion. We find that all investors spend a greater proportion of their wealth in consumption in both bull and bear markets when their risk tolerance increases (that is, α increases). High risk-averse investors (α < 0) consume more proportion of their wealth in a bull market. But on the other hand, low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1) exhibit exactly the opposite pattern by consuming proportionally more in a bear market.
The optimal insurance is proportional to the investor's wealth and such proportion depends on the premium loading θ and the investor's risk aversion parameter α. As the loading θ increases, the demand for insurance decreases and the decrease of the demand for insurance is more significant when θ is small. We observe that all investors reduce the amount of wealth spent in insurance when they become more risk tolerant (as α increases). For high and moderate risk-averse investors (α ≤ 0), the amount of reduction in insurance is greater when α is relatively larger (that is, when α is close to 0). But low risk-averse investors reduce the amount of insurance in difference magnitudes depending on the value of α.
Throughout a comparative analysis, we find the value function V (x, i) to Problem 2.1 is strictly greater than the value function V 1 (x, i) to Problem 5.1 when optimal insurance is not equal to 0 in all regimes. This means if there exist one regime j ∈ S such that I * (x, j, l) > 0, then V (x, i) > V 1 (x, i) for every regime i ∈ S, even in the most extreme case of I * (x, i, l) ≡ 0, for all i = j and i ∈ S. We also observe that the advantage of buying insurance is more significant in a bull market. Investors who face a larger random loss will gain more benefits from purchasing insurance.
